{"id":2157,"date":"2013-04-12T08:37:04","date_gmt":"2013-04-12T08:38:04","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/?p=2157"},"modified":"2017-11-14T21:28:42","modified_gmt":"2017-11-14T19:28:42","slug":"shocking-and-aweing-the-boy-leader-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/shocking-and-aweing-the-boy-leader-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Shocking and aweing the boy leader"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"NorthOver a century ago, as this column noted, events in Europe were simultaneously described as serious but not yet desperate and<\/span> as desperate but not serious.\u00a0 Given the antics of the Boy Sun King in Pyongyang, Kim Jung Un, it is hard to know how serious or desperate the current situation on the Korean peninsula is.<\/p>\n

Kim unilaterally abrogated the truce that ended the Korean War sixty years ago; cut off the hotline with Seoul; threatened to strike America; provocatively moved several of his mobile rockets; restarted the Yongbyon reactor; and warned diplomats in the north to leave in advance of conflict.\u00a0 Is Kim serious in threatening a state of war?\u00a0 Is he desperate? Is he loony? Or has he other motives for consolidating power perhaps before striking a grand bargain with the outside world?\u00a0 No one really knows probably including many of those in his inner circle.<\/p>\n

So far, the United States and South Korea have acted sensibly and prudently.\u00a0 No doubt contingency plans for military options are being closely reviewed and forces being readied in the event Kim does something foolish or if further escalation occurs.\u00a0 What else might be done given that our knowledge and understanding of the North is at best incomplete and lacking?<\/p>\n

Perhaps a little shock and awe might be appropriate in keeping events from becoming desperate while mitigating the risks of further escalation.\u00a0 Shock and awe are about affecting, influencing and controlling will and perception of an adversary.\u00a0 In essence, the aim is to get the adversary to do what we want done or to stop doing what we find offensive or dangerous.\u00a0 Military force may or may not be needed or threatened.<\/p>\n

Given the intransigence of decades of Kim family rule, a direct threat to North Korea is certain to fail.\u00a0 Thus, an indirect and subtle approach through Beijing may offer the best way to affect and influence the leadership\u2019s will and perception.\u00a0 How might that be done?<\/p>\n

The worst case in China\u2019s view is another Korean war with possibly millions of casualties and huge numbers of Koreans fleeing across the Yalu.\u00a0 China also must know that North Korea would be defeated perhaps as quickly as the Taliban and Saddam\u2019s Iraqi Army were routed by the overwhelming power of the U.S., in this case assisted by a very able Korean defense force.\u00a0 That would mean American and South Korean forces crossing or overflying the 38th<\/sup> parallel and heading north to finish the job.\u00a0 A repeat of 1950 is something China would surely do most anything to avoid.<\/p>\n

The United States can influence and reinforce this perception of the dangerous consequences of another Korean War on China.\u00a0 U.S. commanders can brief the press on background or off the record on how a war might be fought; the extent of casualties that could mount into the hundreds of thousands or more; and how it would end for the North.\u00a0 There would be no need for bluster or braggadocio.\u00a0 A straightforward analytical appraisal of the likely outcome of war would be sufficient.<\/p>\n

The question of the post-war peace would surely arise especially the composition of the ruling regime.\u00a0 Further, the U.S.\u2019s U.N. Mission could hold informal talks with China, Russia and others conditioned on Kim taking some form of provocative or military action that leads to war. These talks need not exaggerate the dangers and instead examine the question of \u201cwhat if?\u201d<\/p>\n

Obviously, reports of such talks and briefings will reach Beijing at the speed of light.\u00a0 Most likely, Beijing would remind their colleagues in Pyongyang of the potentially catastrophic consequences of war and inform them of serious American thinking about a post-war north.\u00a0 Whatever motivates Kim, surely survival is a top priority.\u00a0 And the U.S. could de-escalate the standoff when Kim tones down the rhetoric and even claims victory.<\/p>\n

There are risks in any approach.\u00a0 Kim could misperceive this gambit as a direct threat to his survival and conclude war is the only recourse with the Hitlerian twist that should the North lose, it did not deserve to exist.\u00a0 Or, if Kim had more benign intentions to use his machinations to strike a deal with his neighbors, those could be derailed.<\/p>\n

Even if this plan did succeed in defusing the current standoff, what an be done to prevent future crises?\u00a0 That answer must rest in a regional approach with China, Russia, Japan and South Korea engaged to convince Kim that this behavior is destructive to the stability and prosperity of East Asia.\u00a0 China is vital in making that happen.<\/p>\n

Hence, the road to peace and stability starts and stops in Beijing.\u00a0 That must be our focus if we are to restrain Kim. Some shock and awe might help.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Over a century ago, as this column noted, events in Europe were simultaneously described as serious but not yet desperate and as desperate but not serious.\u00a0 Given the antics of the Boy Sun King in Pyongyang, Kim Jung Un, it is hard to know how serious or desperate the current situation on the Korean peninsula is. Kim unilaterally abrogated the truce that ended the Korean War sixty years ago; cut off the hotline with Seoul; threatened to strike America; provocatively moved several of his mobile rockets; restarted the Yongbyon reactor; and warned diplomats in the north to leave in advance of conflict.\u00a0 Is Kim serious in threatening a state of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":2142,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[65,76],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2157","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog-en","category-harlan-ullman-en"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2157"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2157"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2157\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4579,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2157\/revisions\/4579"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2142"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2157"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2157"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2157"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}