{"id":2989,"date":"2013-11-28T19:16:27","date_gmt":"2013-11-28T19:17:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/?p=2989"},"modified":"2017-11-14T21:28:29","modified_gmt":"2017-11-14T19:28:29","slug":"desperately-needed-a-new-security-mindset-for-the-21st-century-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/desperately-needed-a-new-security-mindset-for-the-21st-century-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Desperately needed: a new security mindset for the 21st century"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"Since George Washington was America\u2019s first commander-in-chief, successive administrations have often been accused of either lacking a strategy or having one that did not work. The major exceptions perhaps were the bipartisan policies of containment and deterrence that ultimately prevailed over the Soviet Union.\u00a0 The debate then focused more on means than on ends.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Unfortunately, the success of the Cold War has perpetuated a 20th<\/sup>\u00a0century mindset for national security that cannot and will not work in the 21st<\/sup>\u00a0century.\u00a0 Until we create a relevant framework and paradigm, unless we are unconscionably lucky, our policies will be flawed.\u00a0 And critics will sadly prove correct in assailing our inability to \u201cthink strategically.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n
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The reasons why 20th<\/sup>\u00a0century thinking no longer fits today\u2019s security needs are hidden in plain site.\u00a0 For centuries, national security and strategy have been based in dealing with a state-centric system of international politics predicated on force being the ultimate arbiter of conflict. Indeed, from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, strategic thinkers have used this paradigm in protecting the state from threats and challenges to its existence.<\/span><\/p>\n
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That mindset has been overtaken and bypassed by the diffusion of all forms of power, further accelerated by globally instantaneous and interconnected communications from the Internet to social media and other creations of the information and electronics revolutions.\u00a0 This diffusion of power has had many transformational consequences.\u00a0 The empowerment of individuals and non-state actors is among the most dramatic.<\/span><\/p>\n
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During the 20th<\/sup>\u00a0century and certainly before, it was virtually impossible for individuals and non-state actors acting alone to exert global influence.\u00a0 Certainly, a relatively tiny Bolshevik Party could launch a revolution and take control of Russia in 1917.\u00a0 And a geriatric, exiled Iranian cleric could foment a revolution that toppled the Shah in 1979.\u00a0 But it was not until these cadres wrested control of a state did they achieve the ability to exert influence beyond national borders.\u00a0 Now, virtually anyone with the skills, intent and a smart phone or desktop can achieve global impact. And more stunning, a lone Tunisian fruit vender could spark the Arab awakening by setting himself afire.<\/span><\/p>\n
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The reality is that today\u2019s major threats and dangers are not amenable to state-centric solutions predicated on the utility of military power.\u00a0 If, as this column argues, failed and failing governance is the major impediment to global peace, prosperity and stability, no army or navy will alter that situation.\u00a0 If economic despair, disparity and dislocation constitute the bases for terrorism or revolution, similarly, military force will not relieve the desperate condition for tens of millions of Egyptians living on $2 a day.<\/span><\/p>\n
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These and other factors provoke and empower radical ideologies that in turn have been amplified and exploited by religious extremism that uses terror and violence as the most effective means of turning intent into action.\u00a0 Under these circumstances state-centric strategic formulations will fail.\u00a0 Perhaps the Vietnam War was a harbinger although some will assert the cut-off of funds by a soured American Congress allowed Hanoi to win.\u00a0 However, Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the absolute failure of applying 20th<\/sup>\u00a0century thinking to 21st<\/sup>century crises.<\/span><\/p>\n
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As Lenin asked, what is to be done?\u00a0 During the Cold War, the West was populated with many strategic thinkers and statesmen.\u00a0 Bernard Brodie, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger come to mind on this side of the Atlantic and Raymond Aron and Michael Howard among others in Europe.\u00a0 Today, it is far more difficult to identify and compile a list of such eminent strategic thinkers.<\/span><\/p>\n
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In part, this dearth of thinking arises from the failure of governance. \u00a0Politics, especially in the U.S., is no longer about governing.\u00a0 Politics is about winning—winning elections, winning campaigns, winning on issues at any cost when the most effective means to succeed is through negative and destructive advertising.\u00a0 No matter the issue, one is either for or against— or at grave risk of suffering retribution for disloyalty in abandoning the party line.<\/span><\/p>\n
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In this poisonous atmosphere, it is no accident that strategic thinking has become a casualty. The only solution, absent the elusory White Knight, is through academe.\u00a0 Think tanks and universities must pick up this challenge of changing this antiquated mindset\u2014a daunting task when raising money has become job one of many of these great institutions. And taking the King\u2019s shilling often means serving that particular king and not a more noble cause.<\/span><\/p>\n
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Still, ideas count.\u00a0 And the more think tanks and places of higher education that turn to the task of examining alternative means for creating relevant security mindsets and frameworks, the better off we will all be.\u00a0 If we fail, future Iraqs and Afghanistans and not the victory of the Cold War, will be the legacy.<\/span><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Since George Washington was America\u2019s first commander-in-chief, successive administrations have often been accused of either lacking a strategy or having one that did not work. The major exceptions perhaps were the bipartisan policies of containment and deterrence that ultimately prevailed over the Soviet Union.\u00a0 The debate then focused more on means than on ends. Unfortunately, the success of the Cold War has perpetuated a 20th\u00a0century mindset for national security that cannot and will not work in the 21st\u00a0century.\u00a0 Until we create a relevant framework and paradigm, unless we are unconscionably lucky, our policies will be flawed.\u00a0 And critics will sadly prove correct in assailing our inability to \u201cthink strategically.\u201d The […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":2987,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[69,65,76,102,62,66],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2989","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-americas","category-blog-en","category-harlan-ullman-en","category-issues","category-regions","category-studies-and-analysis"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2989"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2989"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2989\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2990,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2989\/revisions\/2990"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2987"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2989"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2989"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.cass-ro.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2989"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}